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Introduction 
The choice of the best alternatives among a set of all possible alternatives has been a 
matter for study, analysis and debates for a long time. It is hardly to find any sphere where this 
problem did not occur.  
There are a lot of different choice procedures that allow to choose and rank alternatives 
from the initial set [1-10]. In this part, we consider choice procedures of a special type based on 
the superposition principle. Let us remind that by superposition of two choice functions С1(∙) and 
С2(∙) we mean a binary operation ⊙, the result of which is a new function C
*(∙)=C2(∙)⊙C1(∙), 
having the form  Xϵ2A C*(X)=C2(C1(X)) [1]. In other words, superposition consists in sequential 
application of choice functions where the result of the previous choice function C1 is the input 
for the next choice function C2. It is necessary to mention that the change of the order of 
functions may lead to completely different results, as the superposition operation is not 
commutative. 
The interest in superposition of choice procedures can be explained by several reasons. 
First, most existing accurate choice procedures have a high computational complexity so they 
cannot be applied in the cases when the number of alternatives or/and criteria is very large. The 
use of superposition allows to reduce the complexity by applying choice procedures with a low 
computational complexity on first stages and more accurate choice procedures on final stages. 
Thus, the results can be obtained in a reasonable time. Second, there are a lot of situations when 
after applying some choice procedures the remaining set of alternatives is too large. The use of 
superposition allows to avoid such situations through the use of additional choice procedures. 
The change of presentation, a set of criteria or criterial values of some alternatives can 
affect the final choice. Consequently, there is a need for more detailed study of existing choice 
procedures and for understanding which of them can be used in a particular case. 
Thus, we consider the two-stage superposition choice procedures based on scoring rules, 
rules, using majority relation, value function and tournament matrix. The main focus of the paper 
is the study of its properties, its computational complexity and its runtime on real data. The study 
of the properties of two-stage superposition choice procedures is based on the study of the 
properties of different multi-criteria choice procedures which is done in the first part of the study 
[11]. 
This part is divided into several sections. First, some background information on two-
stage choice procedures is given. Second, we form a list of two-stage choice procedures Then, 
we study the properties of two-stage superposition choice procedures. Finally, a computational 
and run-time complexity of studied procedures is given. 
A survey of the literature 
In [1] two-stage extremizational choice procedures that consist of scalar or vector choice 
procedures were studied. The description of such choice procedures is given below. 
Definition 1. A choice function  ( ) is called rationalized by scalar criterion   (or simply 
scalar), if      
 ( )             ( )   ( ) . 
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Suppose now that all alternatives from A are mapped into n criterial scales instead of one 
criterial scale. Denote by  ⃗  a set of n criterial scales  ⃗  (       ), where  ⃗  is a «vector 
criterion», and   , where          , - its component. 
Definition 2. A choice function  ( ) is called rationalized by vector criterion  ⃗  
(       ) or simply vector, if      
 ( )              ⃗( )   ⃗ ( ) , 
where 
 ⃗ ( )   ⃗ ( )              ( )    ( ) 
Thus, there are 4 main types of two-stage extremizational choice procedures 
1. scalar-scalar choice procedure; 
2. scalar-vector choice procedure; 
3. vector-scalar choice procedure; 
4. vector-vector choice procedure. 
As the single–criterion extremizational choice procedure is a special case of the vector 
choice procedure, it is clear that the choice procedure 1 is a special case of choice procedures 2 
and 3, which are special cases of the procedure 4. In [1] it was also shown that scalar-scalar 
choice procedure (type 1) is equivalently reducible to the usual single-criterion extremizational 
choice procedure and two-stage scalar-vector choice procedure - to the usual multi-criteria 
extremizational choice procedure. To define under what circumstances the procedure of type 2 is 
equivalent to the scalar procedure, a notion of ψ-triad was introduced in [1]. 
Definition 3. Let u, v, wϵA, where А is a set of alternatives. These alternatives are said to 
form a ψ-triad if ψ(u) < ψ(v), ψ(u) χ ψ(w) and ψ(v) χ ψ(w), where the inequality is understood as 
some vector (component-wise) inequality, and χ stands for the independent relation introduced as  
 ( )  ( )                   ( )    ( )      ( )    ( ),  
where    a set of criteria,   – vector criterion. 
The scalar-vector two-stage choice procedure (type 2) is equivalent to the one-stage 
single-criterion extremizational choice procedure if and only if the set   lacks ψ-triads for any 
Xϵ2A and the criterion   has the same value over all alternatives from this set, that is      
 ( )        [1]. 
As for the vector-vector choice procedure of type 4, it was shown in [1] that this 
procedure is far from being always reducible to the usual multi-criteria (all the more so, to 
single-criterion) choice procedure. Reducibility is possible only for some special relative 
positions of the alternatives in criterial spaces   and  . 
In [1] there were also defined under which conditions choice procedures of type 3 and 4 
can be reduced to pair-dominant choice procedures. Let us remind that a choice procedure  ( ) is 
called pair-dominant or rationalized by binary relation P if      
 ( )                                                             (1) 
In other words, pair-dominant choice procedure is a procedure for which the rational 
choice consists in the choice of undominated by their pairwise comparisons alternatives. 
To define under which conditions choice procedures of type 4 can be reduced to pair-
dominant choice procedure, a notion of uncoordinated triad was introduced. 
Definition 4. Let u,v,wϵA make up a φ-triad referred to as a φ, ψ-uncoordinated triad of 
the first, or second, or third type if correspondingly 
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1. ψ(w) < ψ(u), ψ(w)  ψ(v) or 
2. ψ(u) χ ψ(w), ψ(v) < ψ(w) or 
3. ψ(u) χ ψ(w), ψ(v) χ ψ(w),  
where φ, ψ – vector criteria, χ – independed relation,   is a violation of the vector inequality <, 
i.e., 
ψ(u)  ψ(v)     :   ( )    ( ). 
It was also proved in [1] that for the two-stage vector-vector choice procedure an 
equivalent pair-dominant choice procedure exists if and only if the alternatives from A do not 
make up φ, ψ-uncoordinated triads of the first type. 
As for a pair-dominant choice procedure, it is necessary to define its levels. It was 
defined in [1] that a pair-dominant choice procedure has the level  ̂ if a preference P on 
alternatives in (1) is acyclic, level  ̂ if P is acyclic and transitive, i.e., it is a partial order, level  ̂ 
if P is acyclic, transitive and negatively transitive, i.e., it is a weak order. 
It turned out that for the two-stage vector-vector choice procedure to generate a choice 
function of level  ̂ (level  ̂), it is necessary and sufficient that no alternatives from set A make up 
φ, ψ-noncoordinated triads of a second type (correspondingly φ, ψ-noncoordinated triads of a 
second and third type, and also ψ , φ-noncoordinated triads of third type). 
Finally, it was proved in [1] that two-stage vector-scalar choice procedure (type 3) is 
equivalent to 
a) a pair-dominant level  ̂ choice procedure; 
b) a one-stage multi-criteria extremizational choice procedure; and 
c) a one-stage single-criterion extremizational choice procedure. 
if and only if there are no φ-triads <u,v,w> (φ – vector criterion) in A satysfying, respectively, the 
following conditions 
a') ψ(u)> ψ(w)≥ ψ(v), where ψ is a scalar criterion; 
b') ψ(u)≥ ψ(w)≥ ψ(v) with at least one strict inequality; 
c') ψ(u)≥ ψ(w)≥ ψ(v). 
In [1] an example of a two-stage choice procedure was provided. This two-stage choice 
procedure operates as follows at the first stage a Pareto set is chosen from initial set X from 
which, at the second stage, an alternative is isolated by Euclidean metric to some «ideal» point 
   (       ) in criterial space, where         – maximum values for each criterion. It 
was shown that this choice procedure can be reduced to its second stage iff  
               ( ). 
In [12] a two-stage sequential choice procedure was studied, the first stage being defined 
by q-Pareto multicriterial choice rule, and the second stage being defined by scalar extremization 
choice procedure.  
Let us define a q-Pareto choice rule that was studied in [2,3]. The main idea of this rule is 
to choose alternatives which are dominated by no more that q alternatives. Hence, it allows to 
avoid situations when the measurement by criterion has not been made very accurately and, 
consequently, it allows not to miss almost optimal elements from the chosen set of alternatives. 
Below we consider q-Pareto choice rule more precisely, but first we need an additional notion of 
upper contour set. 
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The upper contour set   ( ) for an alternative   in the i-th criterion is 
  ( )         ( )    ( ) , 
where   is a vector ctiterion. 
In other words, the upper contour set for   is a set of all alternatives which have higher 
values that   in the criterion i. 
The upper contour set for an alternative   in a set   is defined as [  ( )   ]   
Now, we re-define the Pareto rule as 
   ( )       (⋂ [  ( )   ]   )   . 
Obviously, Pareto rule is a special case of q-Pareto rule when parameter q is equal to 0. 
The generalization of q-Pareto choice rule can be defined as 
   ( )       (⋂ [  ( )   ]   )   . 
Thus, the choice rule consists in choice of alternatives which are dominated by no more 
than q alternatives.  
Example. Consider the following situation.                          . 
A a b c d e f g h k l m 
   1 3 5 0 5 4 4 5 2 4 1 
   5 3 0 4 1 2 5 4 4 4 3 
The results of applying q-Pareto choice rule depending on parameter value q are the 
following 
q C(A) 
0 {g,h} 
1 {a,e,g,h} 
2 {a,c,e,g,h,l} 
3 {a,b,c,e,f,g,h,k,l} 
4 {a,b,c,e,f,g,h,k,l} 
5 {a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,k,l} 
6 {a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,k,l,m} 
In [13] it was studied which rationality conditions are satisfied for q-Pareto choice rule. It 
was found that q-Pareto choice rule satisfies only condition С (see below). 
In [12] q-Pareto choice rule is used on the first stage of two-stage choice procedure. 
However, since the choice set of the first stage usually contains too many elements, obtained set 
is used as a presentation for the second stage constructed by a scalar extremization choice 
procedure. Thus, q-Pareto-scalar choice procedure can be presented as a superposition of two 
choice functions С(∙)=С2(С1(∙)), where С1 is defined by q-Pareto rule, С2 is defined by scalar 
choice procedure.  
q-Pareto-scalar choice procedure was firstly studied in [12]. There were found necessary 
and sufficient conditions when this procedure can be reduced to the choice on scalar criterion. 
Two-stage choice procedure can be reduced to one-stage choice procedure if   ( )    ( ), 
i.e., when for any subset X A the remaining set after the first stage of the rule always contains 
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alternatives which are chosen on the second stage of the rule. In addition, necessary conditions 
were defined in [12] under which rationality conditions are satisfied for two-stage q-Pareto-
scalar choice procedure. 
 
Before moving to the study of the properties of two-stage choice procedures, it is 
necessary to consider the notion of choice functions closedness with respect to superposition 
operator. In order to do it some definitions were given in [1]. 
Any particular choice function С(∙) can be treated as a point of the abstract space , 
consisting of all the possible choice functions on A. 
A set of choice functions С1(∙),…,Сn(∙) is called a functional profile and denoted by 
{Сi(∙)}. 
Let a domain    and number n be fixed. Any mapping from           ⏟    
 
 
times into  is called a functional operator. A functional operator assigns to any profile {Сi(∙)} 
consisting of n choice functions from Q a single choice function denoted by C*(∙)=F({Сi(∙)}), 
where F stands for the functional operator. 
As usual, the set Q
n 
is called the domain of F, and the set of all functions С*(∙) such 
that     ( )   
   (   ( ) )   
 ( ) as the range of operator. 
The set        is called the domain of the functional operator    
  . Any 
domain     such that     ( )   
   (   ( ) )  
  will be called the range of F(       ). 
According to the definition, the domain      of the functional operator   is any subset from  
which includes the range F. 
If   ( )   (   ( ) )   for any functional profile    ( )   
 , the domain Q is called 
closed with respect to the operator F. 
Now introduce functional operator of “superposition” ( ⊙): 
 ⊙          ( )    (  ( ))  
Let us define in which cases superposition, as applied to the choice functions С1(∙) and 
С2(∙) from different domains of , ‘preserves’ the result, i.e., the function С*(∙) in any of the 
domains. With such an approach, it is only natural to speak about ‘superposition’ mapping the 
domains Q1 and Q2 to which, respectively, С1(∙) and C2(∙) belong into the domain   , denoting it 
symbolically as ⊙(Q1,Q2)=  . 
By closedness (conditional and unconditional) of domains, we consider the following. 
The domain     is called conditionally closed at the first superposition stage at fixed domain 
Q2 of the second stage if  ⊙(     )    . Similarly, the domain     is called 
conditionally closed at the second superposition stage at fixed domain Q1 of the first stage if 
 ⊙(     )    . Finally, the domain Q is called unconditionally closed with respect to the 
‘superposition’ operator if ⊙(    )   
 . 
Theorem 1 [1]. There are the following conditions of domains closedness in  with 
respect to the superposition operator ⊙: 
1°. The domain ACA is closed (unconditionally) with respect to superposition operator, 
i.e.,  ⊙(   )     ; none of the domains Q = Н, С, О, H С, H О, C О, H C О us 
closed unconditionally with respect to the superposition operator; 
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2°. For Q1=ACA, the domains Q2 = H, С, H С,  ̂  ̂   ̂  ̂   ̂     ̂   ̂   ̂ are 
conditionally closed at the second superposition stage. For Q1=ACA, the domains Q2 = O, 
H О, C О, H C О are not closed. None of the domains Q2=H or С or... or H C О is closed 
for none Q1 = H, or С, or... or H C О, where the notion of  ̂  ̂  ̂ is used for a class of choice 
functions that satisfies current condition (Н,С,О) as well as the condition of choice non-
emptyness. 
3°. None of the fundamental domains and their intersections Н,С, …, H C О is 
conditionally closed as Q1, at the first superposition stage for Q2 = ACA (and all the more so for 
Q2 = H, С, ..., H C О at the second one). 
Remark. Although generally going out of the classical domain H C, the superposition of 
two classical choice functions may be shown to stay within the fundamental domain С. It means 
that  ⊙(       )   . 
Thus, the results on choice functions closedness with respect to superposition operator 
solve the inverse problem that helps to determine will the function resulting from application of 
this operator to the elements of the set satisfy the rationality conditions Н, С or O. 
Now let us study the properties of two-stage choice procedures. 
Two-stage superposition choice procedures 
We consider the two-stage superposition choice procedures based on scoring rules, rules, 
using majority relation, value function and tournament matrix. A full description of studied 
choice procedures is given in [11]. 
A list of two-stage superposition choice procedures is provided in Table 1.  
Table 1. Two-stage choice procedures 
№ Stage 1 Stage 2 
1-121 
Scoring rules 
(11 procedures) 
Scoring rules (11 procedures) 
122-231 Rules, using majority relation (10 procedures) 
232-286 Rules, using value function (5 procedures) 
287-308 Rules, using tournament matrix (2 procedures) 
309-418 
Rules, using majority 
relation 
(10 procedures) 
Scoring rules (11 procedures) 
419-518 Rules, using majority relation (10 procedures) 
519-568 Rules, using value function (5 procedures) 
569-588 Rules, using tournament matrix (2 procedures) 
589-643 
Rules, using value function 
(5 procedures) 
Scoring rules (11 procedures) 
644-693 Rules, using majority relation (10 procedures) 
694-718 Rules, using value function (5 procedures) 
719-728 Rules, using tournament matrix (2 procedures) 
729-750 
Rules, using tournament 
matrix 
(2 procedures) 
Scoring rules (11 procedures) 
751-770 Rules, using majority relation (10 procedures) 
771-780 Rules, using value function (5 procedures) 
781-784 Rules, using tournament matrix (2 procedures) 
Thus, 784 two-stage procedures of 16 different types are studied.  
As properties of two-stage choice procedures should be studied separately, let us assign 
an identification number to each two-stage choice procedure by the following formula 
      (   )   , 
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where id is an identification number of two-stage choice procedure, i is a number of choice 
procedure from the list above used on the first stage, j is a number of choice procedure from the 
list above used on the second stage. 
Before proceeding to the study of the properties of two-stage choice procedures, it is 
necessary to make some notes. 
Note 1. Table 2 provides a list of two-stage procedures that does not make any sense, i.e., 
the second stage of which does not change the choice. 
Table 2. Two-stage choice procedures that does not make any sense («…» is any studied 
choice procedure) 
Two-stage procedure 
№ Stage 1 Stage 2 
1-28 Simple majority rule … 
113-140 Run-off procedure … 
141-168 Hare rule (Ware procedure) … 
231 Inverse Borda rule Borda rule 
233 Inverse Borda rule Inverse Borda rule 
234 Inverse Borda rule Nanson rule 
259 Nanson rule Borda rule 
261 Nanson rule Inverse Borda rule 
262 Nanson rule Nanson rule 
281-308 Coombs procedure … 
320 Minimal dominant set Minimal dominant set 
348 Minimal undominant set Minimal dominant set 
349 Minimal undominant set Minimal undominant set 
505-532 Condorcet winner … 
533 Core Simple majority rule 
539 Core Borda rule 
540 Core Black procedure 
541 Core Inverse Borda rule 
542 Core Nanson rule 
544 Core Minimal dominant set 
545 Core Minimal undominant set 
546 Core Minimal weakly stable set 
547 Core Fishburn rule 
548 Core Uncovered set I 
549 Core Uncovered set II 
550 Core Richelson rule 
552 Core Core 
553 Core k-stable set (k>1) 
555 Core Copeland rule 1 
556 Core Copeland rule 2 
557 Core Copeland rule 3 
559 Core Minimax procedure 
560 Core Simpson procedure 
Total number of choice procedures - 168 
The simple majority rule, the run-off procedure, the Hare procedure, the Coombs 
procedure and the Condorcet winner choose a single best alternative, consequently, two-stage 
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choice procedures 1-28, 113-168, 281-308, 505-532 which use such procedures on the first stage 
do not make any sense as they do not affect the final choice. 
Also two-stage procedures 231, 233, 234, 259, 261, 262 do not make any sense as the 
first stage of such procedures gives a set of alternatives with the same Borda count. Similarly, 
two-stage procedures 283, 291 do not make any sense as the first stage of such procedures gives 
a set of alternatives which are considered as the worst by the same number of criteria. 
Two-stage procedures 320, 348, 349 do not make any sense as the second stage of such 
procedures does not change the choice. As for two-stage choice procedure 553, it does not make 
any sense, as the result of such procedure is always an empty set. 
Finally, two-stage procedures 533, 539-542, 544-550, 552, 555-557,559-560 do not make 
any sense as        ( ⃗    )                                , where   ( ⃗    ) is 
a first-stage procedure (the core). 
Thus, choice procedures provided in Table 2 are excluded from further consideration. 
Note 2. Properties of two-stage choice procedures which use the Black procedure on the 
first stage completely coincide with properties of two-stage choice procedures which use the 
Borda rule if there is no Condorcet winner. 
Note 3. Table 3 provides a list of two-stage procedures which are equivalent to existing 
choice procedures. 
Table 3. Two-stage procedures equivalent to existing choice procedure 
Two-stage choice procedure 
What procedure is equivalent to 
№ Stage 1 Stage 2 
309 Minimal dominant set Simple majority rule Condorcet winner 
321 Minimal dominant set Minimal undominant set Minimal undominant set 
322 Minimal dominant set Minimal weakly stable set Minimal weakly stable set 
323 Minimal dominant set Fishburn rule Fishburn rule 
324 Minimal dominant set Uncovered set I Uncovered set I 
325 Minimal dominant set Uncovered set II Uncovered set II 
326 Minimal dominant set Richelson rule Richelson rule 
327 Minimal dominant set Condorcet winner Condorcet winner 
328 Minimal dominant set Core Core 
331 Minimal dominant set Copeland rule 1 Copeland rule 1 
332 Minimal dominant set Copeland rule 2 Copeland rule 2 
333 Minimal dominant set Copeland rule 3 Copeland rule 3 
337 Minimal undominant set Simple majority rule Core (single chosen alternative) 
350 Minimal undominant set Minimal weakly stable set Minimal weakly stable set 
355 Minimal undominant set Condorcet winner Condorcet winner 
356 Minimal undominant set Core Core 
393 Fishburn rule Simple majority rule Core (single chosen alternative) 
411 Fishburn rule Condorcet winner Core (single chosen alternative) 
421 Uncovered set I Simple majority rule Core (single chosen alternative) 
439 Uncovered set I Condorcet winner Core (single chosen alternative) 
449 Uncovered set II Simple majority rule Core (single chosen alternative) 
467 Uncovered set II Condorcet winner Core (single chosen alternative) 
477 Richelson rule Simple majority rule Core (single chosen alternative) 
495 Richelson rule Condorcet winner Core (single chosen alternative) 
551 Core Condorcet winner Condorcet winner 
Total number of choice procedures - 25 
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Two-stage choice procedures provided in previous table are equivalent to some existing 
choice procedures. Thus, their properties fully coincided with properties of such existing 
procedures. However, these two-stage procedures are not excluded from further consideration as 
the computational complexity of some of them can be lower than the complexity of existing 
procedures.  
Thus, it remains to study properties of 591 two-stage choice procedures. 
A study of the properties of two-stage choice procedures 
A list of studied normative properties is given in [11]. 
A study of the properties is conducted as follows. If a two-stage choice procedure does 
not satisfy given normative condition, a counter-example is provided. On the country, if a two-
stage choice procedure satisfies given normative condition a necessary proof is followed. The 
study of the properties of two-stage choice procedures is based on the study of the properties of 
multi-criteria choice procedures which is done in [11]. 
The results of the study of the properties of 591 two-stage choice procedures are given in 
Theorem 2. 
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Theorem 2. Information on which choice procedures satisfy given normative conditions is provided in Table 4. 
Table 4. Properties of two-stage choice procedures («+» - choice procedure satisfies given normative condition,  
«-» - choice procedure does not satisfy given normative condition) 
Two-stage choice procedure 
Normative conditions 
Rationality 
conditions 
Monotonicity 
conditions 
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Stage 1 Stage 2 
№ Name № Name 
2 
3 
4 
12 
13 
15 
16 
17 
18 
20 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Plurality rule 
Inverse plurality rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1)  
Minimal dominant set 
Minimal undominant set 
Fishburn rule 
Uncovered set I 
Uncovered set II  
Richelson rule 
Core 
Copeland rule 1  
Copeland rule 2 
Copeland rule 3 
Super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X)  
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
5 
6 
11 
Run-off procedure 
Hare rule (Ware procedure) 
Coombs procedure 
- - - - -  - - 
9 
10 
11 
14 
21 
Inverse Borda rule 
Nanson rule 
Coombs procedure 
Minimal weakly stable set 
k-stable set (k>1) 
1 
5 
6 
11 
19 
Simple majority rule 
Run-off procedure 
Hare rule (Ware procedure) 
Coombs procedure 
Condorcet winner 
- - - - -  - - 
7 
8 
22 
Borda rule 
Black procedure 
Threshold rule 
1 
5 
6 
Simple majority rule 
Run-off procedure 
Hare rule (Ware procedure)  
- - - -   - - 
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Two-stage choice procedure 
Normative conditions 
Rationality 
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Stage 1 Stage 2 
№ Name № Name 
19 Condorcet winner 
2 
3 
4 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Plurality rule 
Inverse plurality rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1)  
Copeland rule 1  
Copeland rule 2 
Copeland rule 3 
Super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X)  
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
1 
19 
Simple majority rule 
Condorcet winner 
- - - -   - - 
13 
20 
Minimal undominant set  
Core 
1 Simple majority rule   - -   - 
- 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Fishburn rule  
Uncovered set I  
Uncovered set II  
Richelson rule 
1 
19 
Simple majority rule 
Condorcet winner 
  - -   - 
- 
7 
8 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Borda rule 
Black procedure 
Threshold rule 
Copeland rule 1  
Copeland rule 2 
Copeland rule 3 
9 
10
21 
Inverse Borda rule 
Nanson rule 
k-stable set (k>1) 
- - - -  - - - 
13 Minimal undominant set 
15 
17 
21 
23 
24 
25 
Fishburn rule 
Uncovered set II 
k-stable set (k>1) 
Copeland rule 1 
Copeland rule 2 
Copeland rule 3 
- - - -  - - - 
15 Fishburn rule 12 Minimal dominant set - - - -  - - - 
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Two-stage choice procedure 
Normative conditions 
Rationality 
conditions 
Monotonicity 
conditions 
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Stage 1 Stage 2 
№ Name № Name 
16 
18 
Richelson rule 
Uncovered set I 
16 
18 
Uncovered set I 
Richelson rule 
26 
27 
28 
Super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X)  
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
12 
13 
20 
Minimal dominant set 
Minimal undominant set 
Core 
- - - -  - - - 
2 
3 
4 
7 
8 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Plurality rule 
Inverse plurality rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1)  
Borda rule 
Black procedure 
Threshold rule 
Copeland rule 1  
Copeland rule 2 
Copeland rule 3 
2 
3 
4 
7 
8 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
20 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Plurality rule 
Inverse plurality rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1)  
Borda rule 
Black procedure 
Minimal dominant set 
Minimal undominant set 
Minimal weakly stable set 
Fishburn rule 
Uncovered set I 
Uncovered set II 
Richelson rule  
Core 
Threshold rule 
Copeland rule 1 
Copeland rule 2 
Copeland rule 3 
Super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X)  
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
- - - -  - - - 
2 
3 
4 
Plurality rule 
Inverse plurality rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1) 
21 k-stable set (k>1) - - - -  - - - 
13 Minimal undominant set 16 Uncovered set I - - - -  - - - 
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Two-stage choice procedure 
Normative conditions 
Rationality 
conditions 
Monotonicity 
conditions 
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Stage 1 Stage 2 
№ Name № Name 
17 Uncovered set II 18 Richelson rule 
16 Uncovered set I 20 Core - - - -  - - - 
12 
13 
Minimal dominant set 
Minimal undominant set 
26 
27 
28 
Super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X)  
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
- - - -  - - - 
20 Core 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
23 
24 
25 
27 
28 
Borda rule 
Black procedure 
Inverse Borda rule 
Nanson rule 
Minimal dominant set 
Minimal undominant set 
Minimal weakly stable set 
Fishburn rule 
Uncovered set I 
Uncovered set II 
Richelson rule 
Copeland rule 1 
Copeland rule 2 
Copeland rule 3 
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
  - -   - - 
17 Uncovered set II 12 Minimal dominant set -  - -  - - - 
9 
10 
14 
21 
Inverse Borda rule 
Nanson rule 
Minimal weakly stable set 
k-stable set (k>1) 
12 
13 
16 
18 
20 
Minimal dominant set 
Minimal undominant set 
Uncovered set I 
Richelson rule 
Core 
- - - - - - - - 
15 
17 
Fishburn rule 
Uncovered set II  
13 
20 
Minimal undominant set 
Core 
- - - - - - - - 
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Two-stage choice procedure 
Normative conditions 
Rationality 
conditions 
Monotonicity 
conditions 
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Stage 1 Stage 2 
№ Name № Name 
18 Richelson rule 
9 
10 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
21 
26 
27 
28 
Inverse Borda rule 
Nanson rule 
Minimal weakly stable set 
Fishburn rule 
Uncovered set I 
Uncovered set II  
Richelson rule 
k-stable set (k>1) 
Super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X)  
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
2 
4 
8 
14 
15 
17 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Plurality rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1) 
Black procedure 
Minimal weakly stable set 
Fishburn rule 
Uncovered set II 
k-stable set (k>1) 
Threshold rule 
Copeland rule 1 
Copeland rule 2 
Copeland rule 3 
Super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X)  
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
- - - - - - - - 
12 
13 
Minimal dominant set 
Minimal undominant set 
2 
3 
4 
7 
8 
22 
Plurality rule 
Inverse plurality rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1) 
Borda rule 
Black procedure 
Threshold rule 
- - - - - - - - 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
21 
26 
27 
Minimal weakly stable set 
Fishburn rule 
Uncovered set I 
Uncovered set II  
Richelson rule 
k-stable set (k>1) 
Super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X)  
Minimax procedure 
3 
7 
9 
10 
Inverse plurality rule 
Borda rule 
Inverse Borda rule 
Nanson rule 
- - - - - - - - 
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Two-stage choice procedure 
Normative conditions 
Rationality 
conditions 
Monotonicity 
conditions 
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Stage 1 Stage 2 
№ Name № Name 
28 Simpson procedure 
9 
10 
Inverse Borda rule 
Nanson rule 
3 
11 
Inverse plurality rule - - - - - - - - 
16 Uncovered set I 13 Minimal undominant set - - - - - - - - 
20 Core 
2 
3 
4 
22 
26 
Plurality rule 
Inverse plurality rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1) 
Threshold rule 
Super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X)  
- - - - - - - - 
2 
3 
4 
12 
13 
23 
24 
25 
Plurality rule 
Inverse plurality rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1) 
Minimal dominant set 
Minimal undominant set 
Copeland rule 1 
Copeland rule 2 
Copeland rule 3 
9 
10 
Inverse Borda rule 
Nanson rule 
- - - - - - - - 
26 
27 
28 
Super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X)  
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
16 
18 
Uncovered set I 
Richelson rule 
- - - - - - - - 
The proof of the theorem is provided in Appendix 1. 
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Computational complexity of choice procedures 
A computational complexity of choice procedures used in two-stage superpositions is 
provided in Table 5.  
Table 5. Theoretical computational complexity of existing choice procedures (M – cardinality of 
initial set of alternatives, n – number of criteria, q,k – parameters of choice procedures, l,d – 
parameters which depend on initial set of alternatives,          ) 
№ Name of choice procedure 
Computational complexity 
(theoretical) 
Maximum number of 
remaining alternatives 
after applying 
the choice procedure 
1 Simple majority rule  (   ) 1 
2 Plurality rule  (   )   
3 Inverse plurality rule  (   )     
4 q-Approval rule (q>1)  (        (   ))     
5 Run-off procedure  (   ) 1 
6 Hare rule (Ware procedure)  (   ) 1 
7 Borda rule  (      ( )   )   
8 Black procedure  (      ( )   )   
9 Inverse Borda rule  (    )   
10 Nanson rule  (    )   
11 Coombs procedure  (    )   
12 Minimal dominant set  (       )   
13 Minimal undominant set  (       )   
14 Minimal weakly stable set  (     ∑  
  (   )
 
   
)   
15 Fishburn rule  (  )   
16 Uncovered set I  (  )   
17 Uncovered set II  (  )   
18 Richelson rule  (  )   
19 Condorcet winner  (   ) 1 
20 Core  (    )   
21 k-stable set (k>1)  (       )   
22 Threshold rule  (   )   
23 Copeland rule 1  (    )   
24 Copeland rule 2  (    )   
25 Copeland rule 3  (    )   
26 Super-threshold rule  ( )   
27 Minimax procedure  (    )   
28 Simpson procedure  (    )   
A computational complexity of choice procedures was calculated by the author of the paper.  
Based on information provided in Table 5 we can divide all two-stage procedures in several 
groups in accordance with their computational complexity. The results are provided in Table 6.  
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Table 6. A computational complexity of two-stage choice procedures («…» is any choice 
procedure) 
Two-stage choice procedure 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
Choice procedures with a low computational complexity 
Plurality rule 
Threshold rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1) 
… 
Inverse plurality rule 
Super-threshold rule 
Borda rule 
Black procedure 
Simple majority rule 
Run-off procedure 
Hare rule (Ware procedure) 
Borda rule 
Black procedure 
Condorcet winner 
Plurality rule 
Threshold rule 
Inverse plurality rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1) 
Super-threshold rule 
Computational complexity depends on initial set of alternatives 
Inverse plurality rule 
Super-threshold rule 
Borda rule 
Black procedure 
Inverse Borda rule 
Nanson rule 
Core 
Copeland rules 1-3 
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
Coombs procedure 
Choice procedures with average computational complexity 
Inverse Borda rule 
Nanson rule 
Core 
Copeland rules 1-3 
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
Simple majority rule 
Run-off procedure 
Hare rule (Ware procedure) 
Borda rule 
Black procedure 
Condorcet winner 
Plurality rule 
Threshold rule 
Inverse plurality rule 
q-Approval rule (q>1) 
Super-threshold rule 
Inverse Borda rule 
Nanson rule 
Core 
Copeland rules 1-3 
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
Coombs procedure 
Coombs procedure … 
Choice procedures with a high computational complexity 
Inverse plurality rule 
Super-threshold rule 
Borda rule 
Black procedure 
Inverse Borda rule 
Minimal dominant set 
Minimal undominant set 
Minimal weakly stable set 
Fishburn rule 
Uncovered set I, II 
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Two-stage choice procedure 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
Nanson rule 
Core 
Copeland rules 1-3 
Minimax procedure 
Simpson procedure 
Richelson rule 
k-stable set (k>1) 
Minimal dominant set 
Minimal undominant set 
Minimal weakly stable set 
Fishburn rule 
Uncovered set I, II 
Richelson rule 
k-stable set (k>1) 
… 
The run-time complexity for two-stage superposition choice procedures 
Let the initial set M1 contains 300 thousands of alternatives and the total number of criteria is 
equal to 10. Suppose, a computer can process around 3 billion instructions per second. Consider 
situations when the remaining set M2 after applying the first-stage choice procedure contains 10, 50 
and 100 thousands of alternatives. 
The run-time complexity of two-stage choice procedures from different groups (according to 
Table 6) is provided in Table 7. 
Table 7. The run-time complexity for two-stage choice procedures (M2 – number of alternatives 
remained after applying the first stage of the choice procedure) 
Two-stage choice procedures 
Run time 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
Choice procedures with a low computational 
complexity 
M2=10000 M2=50000 M2=100000 
Plurality rule Uncovered set I ≈50 ms 
Inverse plurality rule Condorcet winner ≈52 ms ≈58 ms ≈66 ms 
Super-threshold rule Threshold rule ≈6 ms ≈13 ms ≈21 ms 
Borda rule Plurality rule ≈910 ms ≈918 ms ≈926 ms 
Computational complexity depends on initial set of alternatives 
Inverse plurality rule Minimax procedure ≈16 s ≈7 min ≈27 min 
Choice procedures with average computational complexity 
Inverse Borda rule Simple majority rule ≈4 h 12 min 
Minimax procedure Simpson procedure ≈4 h 15 min ≈4 h 21 min ≈4 h 36 min 
Choice procedures with a high computational complexity 
Inverse plurality rule Richelson rule ≈46 h 20 min ≈241 days ≈5 years 
Uncovered set I Borda rule ≈140 years 
The results obtained from Tables 6 and 7 give us information on which procedures can be 
applied when we deal with Big Data and which procedures cannot be applied in such problems as 
they are not allow to obtain any results in a sufficient time.  
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Conclusion 
We have studied the properties of 592 two-stage choice procedures, which can be used in 
various multi-criteria problems. It was defined which choice procedures satisfy given normative 
conditions, showing how a final choice is changed due to the changes of preferences or a set of 
feasible alternatives. Such information leads to a better understanding of different choice procedures 
and how stable and sensible is a set of alternatives obtained after applying some choice procedure. 
The results show that most of the two-stage procedures do not satisfy any normative 
conditions. Only some of them satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1. More detailed information is 
provided in Table 4. 
To compute run-time complexity of choice procedures the average computational complexity 
was used. All choice procedures were divided into different groups (see Table 6). It was shown that 
two-stage choice procedures which use choice procedures with a high computational complexity on 
the first stage require more time than other procedures. It means that such procedures are not 
recommended to use in applications to Big Data. Two-stage choice procedures which use on the first 
stage choice procedures with a low computational complexity and on the second stage - with a high 
computational complexity can be used in applications to Big Data, however, their application 
depends on the number of alternatives remained after the first stage. Two-stage choice procedures, 
which use on both stages choice procedures with a low computational complexity, can be used in 
applications to Big Data with no restrictions. 
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Appendix 1. Properties of two-stage choice procedures 
Two-stage choice procedure 29. ‘Plurality rule – Simple majority rule’ 
29.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c b b 
с с b a a 
b b a c c 
According to the two-stage choice procedure  ( ⃗    )       
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
c c c b b 
b b b c c 
According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )        
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗    )   
 . Thus, the condition H is not satisfied. 
29.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a b c 
b a b 
c c a 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the choice is empty, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )      
Now let us consider the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as  
P1 P2 P3 
a b b 
b a a 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )       
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as  
P1 P2 P3 
b b c 
c c b 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )       
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
29.3 Outcast condition (O) 
The condition O is not satisfied (see paragraph 29.1 of Appendix 1). 
29.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The condition ACA is not satisfied since the two-stage choice procedure does not satisfy the condition H. 
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29.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let  ( ⃗    )     . It means that 
1.            (   ⃗  )   
 (   ⃗  ) or  
2.            (   ⃗  )   
 (   ⃗  )      
 (   ⃗   )  
 
 
   ⃗    , where  
  is a set of 
alternatives remained for the second stage of the choice procedure. 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then 
   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    (   ⃗  ),  
 (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    (   ⃗  )    
   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    (   ⃗  )  
 (     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗)    (   ⃗   )     | ⃗  |     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  .  
Thus,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )     . 
Then    ( ⃗    )        (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Consequently, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is satisfied. 
29.6 Monotonicity condition 2 
Since given two-stage choice procedure chooses no more than one best alternative, the Monotonicity 
conditionon 2 is not applicable to it as it considers the choice of more than two alternatives. In other 
words, such two-stage choice procedure obeys the Monotonicity conditionon 2 trivially. 
29.7 Strict monotonicity condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a a b 
c b c 
b c a 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )        
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative c in   
 : 
  
    
    
  
c a b 
a b c 
b c a 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the choice is empty, i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )      
 (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
Thus, the strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied. 
29.8 Non-compensatory condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a a b 
b b c 
c c a 
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According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )        
Let us write the profile  ⃗   in the following form 
X          
a 3 3 1 
b 2 2 3 
c 1 1 2 
According to the non-compensatory condition the alternative b is better than the alternative a and the 
alternative a is better than the alternative c. Thus, the non-compensatory condition is not satisfied as 
     ( ⃗    ). 
Two-stage choice procedures 30-46. 
Two-stage choice procedures 30-46 do not satisfy the same conditions as choice procedures which are 
used on the second stage. To prove it we can use the same examples but with larger number of 
alternatives omitted on the first stage of the choice procedure [11].  
Example. Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c b b 
с с b a a 
b b a c c 
Let us transform this example to the following form 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
d e f g h a b c a b c 
a a c b b b c a c a b 
с с b a a c a b b c a 
b b a c c … 
… 
According to the plurality rule the alternatives d,e,f,g,h are omitted on the first stage of the procedure 
and the alternatives a,b,c are presented for choice on the second stage. 
Thus, it is necessary to check those normative conditions of two-stage choice procedures which are 
satisfied for the choice procedures of the second stage. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 30-32,35-36,40-56 satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1 (the 
proof follows from the paragraph 29.5 of Appendix 1 and properties of second stage choice 
procedures). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 40,45,47,48 do not satisfy the condition C. To proof it the 
following example is used. 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
c c c b b b d d d d a a a a 
a a a d d d b b c c b b b c 
d d d a a a c c b b c c c b 
b b b c c c a a a a d d d d 
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Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗  ) for each alternative    :  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , 
  (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   . According to the rule the alternatives a and d will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗    )          
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
c c c b b b b b c c a a a a 
a a a a a a c c b b b b b c 
b b b c c c a a a a c c c b 
Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗   ) for each alternative    
 :   (   ⃗   )   ,  
 (   ⃗   )   , 
  (   ⃗   )   . Thus, the alternative a will be omitted on the first stage and the alternative b will be 
chosen on the second stage, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )       
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
c c c b b b d d d d b b b c 
d d d d d d b b c c c c c b 
b b b c c c c c b b d d d d 
Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗    ) for each alternative    
  :   (   ⃗    )   ,  
 (   ⃗    )   , 
  (   ⃗    )   . According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )       
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ( ⃗    ). Thus, the two-stage choice procedure does not 
satisfy the condition С. 
 
 Two-stage choice procedures 40,47 do not satisfy the condition O (see paragraph 29.1 of 
Appendix 1). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 47,48 do not satisfy the condition H (see paragraph 29.1 of 
Appendix 1). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 48,54 do not satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 2. To prove it 
the following example is used. 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
a a c b b c 
с c a c c b 
b b b a a a 
Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗  ) for each alternative    :  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , 
  (   ⃗  )   . According to the plurality rule used on the first stage the alternatives a and b will be 
chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )          
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
a a c c c c 
с c a a a a 
According to the plurality rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )     . 
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Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P5 
с c c b b c 
b b b c c b 
According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )     . 
Then        ( ⃗    ),      ( ⃗     
 )          ( ⃗      
  ). Thus, the two-stage choice 
procedure does not satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 2. 
 Two-stage choice procedure 50 does not satisfy the non-compensatory condition. To prove 
it the following example is used. 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a a b 
с c c 
b b a 
Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗  ) for each alternative    :  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , 
  (   ⃗  )   . According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )        
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative c in   
 : 
  
    
    
  
a c b 
с a c 
b b a 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c will be chosen, i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )            
 (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
Thus, the strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied. 
 
Two-stage choice procedures 57-84. 
Two-stage choice procedures 57-84 do not satisfy the same conditions as choice procedures which are 
used on the second stage. To prove it we can use the same examples but with larger number of 
alternatives which are regarded as the worst by the maximum number of criteria [11].  
Thus, it is necessary to check those normative conditions of two-stage choice procedures which were 
satisfied for the second stage choice procedures. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 57,75,76 do not satisfy the condition H. To prove it the following 
example is used. 
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Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
b d a 
a b d 
c a c 
d c b 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )        
Consider now the subset            . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 
b b a 
a a b 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )        
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗    )   
 . Thus, the condition H is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 57,68,75 do not satisfy the condition O (see the previous 
example). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 68,73,75,76 do not satisfy the condition С. To prove it the 
following example is used. 
Consider the previous example. According to the rule  ( ⃗    )     . 
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 
b d a 
a b d 
d a b 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,d will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )           
Finally, let us consider the subset            . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 
b b c 
c c b 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )        
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 57-60, 63,64, 68-84 satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1 (the 
proof follows from the properties of the inverse plurality rule and second stage choice 
procedures). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 76,82 do not satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 2. To prove it 
the following example is used. 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
c c c a a b b c c c 
a a a b b a a b b b 
b b b c c c c a a a 
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According to the rule the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )         
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
c c c a a a a c c c 
a a a c c c c a a a 
According to the inverse plurality rule used on the first stage the alternative c will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗     
 )     . Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a 
set    , i.e.,  ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
c c c b b b b c c c 
b b b c c c c b b b 
According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )     . 
Then        ( ⃗    ),      ( ⃗     
 )          ( ⃗      
  ). Thus, the Monotonicity 
conditionon 2 is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedure 78 does not satisfy the non-compensatory condition. To prove it 
let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
a b c b 
b a a c 
c c b a 
According to the non-compensatory condition the alternative b is better than the alternative a which 
is better than the alternative c. However, according to the two-stage choice procedure 78, the 
alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )          Thus, the non-compensatory condition is not 
satisfied as      ( ⃗    ). 
Two-stage choice procedures 85-112. 
Two-stage choice procedures 85-112 satisfy the same conditions as two-stage choice procedures 30-
46 which use the plurality rule on the first stage. The proof follows from properties of q-Approval 
rule [11]. 
Two-stage choice procedures 169-196. 
Two-stage choice procedures 169-196 do not satisfy the same conditions as choice procedures which 
are used on the second stage. To prove it we can use the same examples [11] but with larger number of 
alternatives which are omitted on the first stage that were used to check the properties of the Borda 
rule. 
Thus, it is necessary to check those normative conditions of two-stage choice procedures which were 
satisfied for the second stage choice procedures. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 169,187,188 do not satisfy the condition H. To prove it the 
following example is provided. 
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Let               and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
e e a b b 
a a d c c 
b b c e a 
c c b a d 
d d e d e 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )    (   ⃗  )      (   ⃗  )     
 (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )    . According to the rule the alternatives c,d,e will be omitted on the first 
stage and the alternative a will be chosen on the second stage, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )        
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
e e a b b 
a a c c c 
b b b e a 
c c e a e 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗   )     (   ⃗   )     (   ⃗   )   , 
 (   ⃗   )   . According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      )     . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗    )   
 . Thus, the condition H is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 169, 180, 187 do not satisfy the condition O (see the previous 
example). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 180,185,187,188 do not satisfy the condition С (see paragraph 
7.2 of the previous section). 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a b c 
c a b 
d d a 
b c d 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  )    
 (   ⃗  )   . According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
 
P1 P2 P3 
a b c 
c a b 
b c a 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗   )   (   ⃗   )   (   ⃗   )   . 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      )         . 
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as 
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P1 P2 P3 
c b c 
d d b 
b c d 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗    )   ,  (   ⃗    )   ,  (   ⃗    )   . 
According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗        )     . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 169-196 satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1 (the proof 
follows from properties of the Borda rule). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 188, 194 do not satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 2. To prove 
it the following example is provided. 
Let                 and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a a f f f f c 
b b b b b b c f 
c c c a a a e e 
d d d c c c d d 
e e e d d d b a 
f f f e e e a b 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )    , 
 (   ⃗  )      (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )    . According to the rule the alternatives a,b will be chosen, 
i.e.,  ( ⃗    )         
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a a f f f f c 
c c c a a a c f 
d d d c c c e e 
e e e d d d d d 
f f f e e e a a 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗   )      (   ⃗   )      (   ⃗   )  
  ,  (   ⃗   )     (   ⃗   )    . According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗      )     . 
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
b b b f f f f c 
c c c b b b c f 
d d d c c c e e 
e e e d d d d d 
f f f e e e b b 
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Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗    )      (   ⃗    )      (   ⃗    )  
  ,  (   ⃗    )     (   ⃗    )    . According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗        )     . 
Then        ( ⃗    ),      ( ⃗     
 )          ( ⃗      
  ). Thus, the Monotonicity 
conditionon 2 is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedure 190 does not satisfy the non-compensatory condition. To prove it 
let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a a b 
b b c 
c c a 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )        
However, according to the non-compensatory condition the alternative b is better than the alternative a 
which is better than the alternative c.  
Thus, the non-compensatory condition is not satisfied as      ( ⃗    ). 
Two-stage choice procedures 197-224. 
To check the properties of two-stage choice procedures 197-224 similar examples, which were given 
to check the properties of existing choice procedures [11], can be used. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 197-224 do not satisfy the conditions H and O. To prove it the 
following example is provided. 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a d b b 
b b a d d 
d d b a a 
In this example none of alternatives is a Condorcet winner (           ). Thus, the Borda rule is 
used for this case. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )  
   (   ⃗  )   . According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a a b b 
b b b a a 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )        
 ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗    )   
 . Thus, the condition H is not satisfied. 
 ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition O is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 197-224 do not satisfy the condition С. To prove it the following 
example is provided. 
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Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c d d 
d d b b b 
с с a a a 
b b d c c 
In this example none of alternatives is a Condorcet winner (                       ). Thus, the 
Borda rule is used for this case. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )  
   (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )   ,  (   ⃗  )    . According to the rule the alternative d will be chosen, 
i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c b b 
с с b a a 
b b a c c 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      )     . 
Finally, let us consider the subset            . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a a d d 
d d d a a 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )     . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 197-224 do not satisfy the condition ACA since such choice 
procedures do not satisfy the condition H. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 197-224 satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1 (the proof 
follows from the properties of the Black procedure). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 198-200, 203-214, 216-224 do not satisfy the Monotonicity 
conditionon 2 (the proof follows from the properties of the Black procedure). 
 Since two-stage choice procedures 197, 201-202, 215 chooses no more than one best 
alternative, the Monotonicity conditionon 2 is not applicable to these procedures as it considers 
the choice of more than two alternatives. In other words, such two-stage choice procedures 
obey the Monotonicity conditionon 2 trivially. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 197-224 do not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition (the 
proof follows from the properties of the Black procedure). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 197-224 do not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (the 
proof follows from the properties of the Black procedure). 
Two-stage choice procedures 225-252. 
Two-stage choice procedures 225-252 do not satisfy the same properties as the Inverse Borda rule. To 
prove it we can use the same examples that were used to check the properties of the Inverse Borda rule 
[11]. 
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Two-stage choice procedures 253-280. 
Two-stage choice procedures 253-280 do not satisfy the same properties as the Nanson rule. To prove 
it we can use the same examples that were used to check the properties of the Nanson rule [11].  
Two-stage choice procedures 281-308. 
Two-stage choice procedures 281-308 do not satisfy the same properties as the Coombs procedure. To 
prove it we can use the same examples that were used to check the properties of the Coombs procedure 
[11].  
Two-stage choice procedures 310-319, 330, 334-336 
310.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
b d a a b d b d a c 
d c b c a c c c b a 
a a d b c b d a d d 
c b c d d a a b c b 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,d will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )            
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a in   
 : 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
  
b d a a b d b d a c 
d c b c a c c c b a 
a a d b c b a a d d 
c b c d d a d b c b 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the alternative d is omitted on the first stage. Consider 
now the subset          . A contraction of a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  onto a set   , i.e.,    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗, looks as  
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
  
b c a a b c b c a c 
a a b c a b c a b a 
c b c b c a a b c b 
According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )     .  
Then      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied. 
311.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
b d c a a d b d a d 
d a b c b c c c b a 
c c a b c b a a d b 
a b d d d a d b c c 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )            
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a in   
 : 
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b a c a a d b d a d 
d d b c b c c c b a 
c c a b c b a a d b 
a b d d d a d b c c 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the alternative d is omitted on the first stage. Consider 
now the subset          . A contraction of a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  onto a set   , i.e.,    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗, looks as  
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
  
b a c a a c b c a a 
c c b c b b c a b b 
a b a b c a a b c c 
According to the rule the alternatives b,c will be chosen, i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )       . 
Then      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied. 
315.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
b d c a a d b d a d 
d c b c b c c c b a 
c a a b c b a a d b 
a b d d d a d b c c 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  )  
  . According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c,d will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )              
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a in    
 : 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
  
b d c a a d b d a a 
d c b c b c c c b d 
c a a b c b a a d b 
a b d d d a d b c c 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the alternative d is omitted on the first stage. Consider 
now the subset          . A contraction of a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  onto a set   , i.e.,    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗, looks as  
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
  
b c c a a c b c a a 
c a b c b b c a b b 
a b a b c a a b c c 
According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )     . 
Then      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied. 
 
To check the remaining normative conditions of given two-stage choice procedures similar examples 
which were given to check the properties of existing choice procedures can be used. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 310-319, 330, 334-336 do not satisfy the condition H (see the 
properties of minimal dominant set). 
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 Two-stage choice procedures 310-319, 330, 334-336 do not satisfy the condition С (see the 
properties of the procedures used on the second stage). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 310-319, 330, 334-336 do not satisfy the condition O (see the 
properties of the procedures used on the second stage and paragraphs 310.5, 315.5 of Appendix 
1). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 310-319, 330, 334-336 do not satisfy the condition ACA since 
such choice procedures do not satisfy the condition H. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 310-319, 330 do not satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1 (see 
the properties of the Coombs procedure for choice procedure 319 and paragraphs 310.5, 311.5, 
315.5 for other choice procedures). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 334-336 satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1 (the proof 
follows from the properties of minimal dominant set and second stage choice procedures). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 310-313, 316-319, 330, 334-336 do not satisfy the Monotonicity 
conditionon 2 (see the properties of minimal dominant set). 
 Since two-stage choice procedures 314-315 chooses no more than one best alternative, the 
Monotonicity conditionon 2 is not applicable to these procedures as it considers the choice of 
more than two alternatives. In other words, such two-stage choice procedures obey the 
Monotonicity conditionon 2 trivially. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 310-319, 330, 334-336 do not satisfy the strict monotonicity 
condition (see the properties of minimal dominant set). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 310-319, 330, 334-336 do not satisfy the non-compensatory 
condition (see the properties of minimal dominant set). 
Two-stage choice procedures 338-347, 350-364 
Since minimal undominated set is equal to minimal dominant set when the number of criteria is odd, 
two-stage choice procedures 338-347, 358, 362-364 do not satisfy the same conditions as two-stage 
choice procedures 310-319, 330, 334-336, which use minimal dominant set on the first stage. 
Consider now the properties of other two-stage choice procedures. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 351-354, 357, 359-361 do not satisfy the condition H, C and O. 
To prove it let             and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
b a a b a d 
a c d a c b 
c d b c d c 
d b c d b a 
For this case a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d 
a - 0 1 1 
b 0 - 1 0 
c 0 0 - 1 
d 0 1 0 - 
According to the rule the alternative a is included in minimal undominated set Q. Thus,  ( ⃗    )  
     . 
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Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
b c d b c d 
c d b c d b 
d b c d b c 
According to the rule the alternatives b,c,d make the minimal undominated set. Thus,  ( ⃗     
 )  
       . 
Finally, consider the subset             . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
b a a b a b 
a b b a b a 
According to the rule the alternatives a and b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )       . 
 ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗    )   
 . Thus, the condition H is not satisfied. 
 ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
 ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition O is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 351-354, 357, 359-361 do not satisfy the condition ACA since 
such two-stage choice procedures do not satisfy the condition H. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 351-354, 357, 359-361 satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1 
(the proof follows from properties of minimal undominated set and second stage choice 
procedures). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 351-354, 357, 359-361 do not satisfy the Monotonicity 
conditionon 2 (see the properties of minimal undominated set). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 351-354, 357, 359-361 do not satisfy the strict monotonicity 
condition (see the properties of minimal undominated set). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 351-354, 357, 359-361 do not satisfy the non-compensatory 
condition (see the properties of minimal undominated set). 
Two-stage choice procedures 365-392 
Two-stage choice procedures do not satisfy the same conditions as choice procedures used on the 
second stage. To prove it we can use the same examples but with larger number of alternatives 
eliminated on the first stage of the two-stage choice procedure [11]. 
Thus, it is necessary to check those normative conditions of two-stage choice procedures which were 
satisfied for the second stage choice procedures. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 365,383,384 do not satisfy the condition H (see paragraph 365.1 
of Appendix 1). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 365, 376 do not satisfy the condition O (see paragraph 365.1 of 
Appendix 1). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 376, 381, 383, 384 do not satisfy the condition С. To prove it the 
following example is used. 
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Let               and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d e 
a - 1 0 0 0 
b 0 - 1 0 0 
c 0 0 - 1 1 
d 1 0 0 - 0 
e 0 0 0 1 - 
According to the rule the alternatives a and c are included in minimal weakly stable set Q. Thus, 
 ( ⃗    )         . 
Consider now the subset          . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 a b c d 
a - 1 0 0 
b 0 - 1 0 
c 0 0 - 1 
d 1 0 0 - 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c,d are included in minimal weakly stable set, i.e., 
 ( ⃗     
 )             
Finally, consider the subset           . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 b c d e 
b - 1 0 0 
c 0 - 1 1 
d 0 0 - 0 
e 0 0 1 - 
According to the rule the alternative b is included in minimal weakly stable set, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )  
     
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 383, 384 do not satisfy the condition С (see paragraph 383.2 of 
Appendix 1). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 365-375, 383-384, 386, 390-392 do not satisfy the Monotonicity 
conditionon 1 (the proof follows from the paragraph 365.5 of Appendix 1). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 376-382, 385, 387-389 do not satisfy the Monotonicity 
conditionon 1 (the proof follows from the paragraph 376.5 of Appendix 1). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 365-392 do not satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 2 (see the 
properties of minimal weakly stable set). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 365-392 do not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (see the 
properties of minimal weakly stable set). 
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365.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let                 and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a b c d e f 
a  - 1 0 0 0 1 
b 0 - 1 0 0 0 
c 1 0 - 0 0 0 
d 0 1 0 - 0 0 
e 0 0 0 1 - 0 
f 0 0 0 0 1 - 
Minimal weakly stable set is chosen on the first stage of choice procedure. According to the rule the 
alternatives a,c are included in minimal weakly stable set Q, i.e.,        . 
Simple majority rule is used on the second stage of the choice procedure. Consider now the 
remaining set                . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 
c c a 
a a c 
According to the simple majority rule, the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
Consider now the subset              . Then, according to the two-stage choice procedure, the 
alternatives a,b,c are included in minimal weakly stable set   .  
Simple majority rule is used on the second stage of the choice procedure. Consider now the 
remaining set                . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 
c b a 
a c b 
b a c 
According to the rule the choice is empty, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )   . 
Then  ( ⃗    )   
       ( ⃗     
 ). Thus, the condition H is not satisfied. 
365.5 Monotonicity condition 1. 
Consider the example from paragraph 365.1. According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗    )     . 
Suppose that the relative comparison of the alternative с and the alternative d is changed (сµd) while 
the relative comparison of any pair of other alternatives remains unchanged. Then a matrix of 
majority relation looks as 
  a b c d e f 
a  - 1 0 0 0 1 
b 0 - 1 0 0 0 
c 1 0 - 1 0 0 
d 0 1 0 - 0 0 
e 0 0 0 1 - 0 
f 0 0 0 0 1 - 
Minimal weakly stable set is used on the first stage of choice procedure. For this case the alternatives 
a,b,c form a minimal weakly stable set. Simple majority rule is applied on the second stage of the two-
stage choice procedure. Since cµa, aµb, bµc,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )   . 
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Then      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied. 
 
376.5 Monotonicity condition 1. 
Let                 and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o 
a - 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
c 0 1 - 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
d 1 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e 0 0 0 1 - 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
h 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 1 0 0 0 0 
j 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 
k 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 
l 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 
m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 1 
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c make a minimal weakly stable set. Thus, the alternatives d, 
e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o will be omitted on the first stage and the alternatives a,b,c will be chosen on 
the second stage of the two-stage choice procedure, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )         . 
Suppose that the relative comparison of the alternative a and the alternative d is changed (aµd) while 
the relative comparison of any pair of other alternatives remains unchanged. Then a matrix of 
majority relation looks as 
  a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o 
a - 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
c  1 - 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
d 1 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e 0 0 0 1 - 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
h 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 1 0 0 0 0 
j 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 
k 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 
l 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 
m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 1 
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 
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According to the rule the alternatives a,b make a minimal weakly stable set. Thus, the alternatives c, d, 
e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o will be omitted on the first stage and the alternative b will be chosen on the 
second stage of the two-stage choice procedure (bµa), i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )     . 
Then      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied. 
383.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let                     and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a b c d e f g h 
a - 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
b 0 - 1 1 1 0 0 0 
c 1 0 - 0 0 0 0 1 
d 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 
e 0 0 1 0 - 0 0 0 
f 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 
g 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 
h 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 
On the first stage of the two-stage choice procedure minimal weakly stable set is defined. For this case 
there are 3 minimal weakly stable sets:                      . Thus,                     
         .  
On the second stage of the two-stage choice procedure a Condorcet winner rule is used. For this case 
there is no Condorcet winner (aµb, aµd, cµa, bµc, dµc), Thus,  ( ⃗    )   . 
Consider now the subset                . A matrix of majority relation µ looks as 
 
a b d 
a - 1 1 
b 0 - 1 
d 0 0 - 
On the first stage of the two-stage choice procedure minimal weakly stable set is defined. For this case 
the alternative a makes a minimal weakly stable set. Thus,  ( ⃗     
 )     . 
Finally, consider the subset           . Then a matrix of majority relation µ looks as 
  a c d e f g h 
a - 0 1 0 0 0 0 
c 1 - 0 0 0 0 1 
d 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 
e 0 1 0 - 0 0 0 
f 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 
g 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 
h 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 
On the first stage of the two-stage choice procedure minimal weakly stable set is defined. For this case 
the alternatives a and d make a minimal weakly stable set. On the second stage of the two-stage choice 
procedure a Condorcet winner rule is used. Since aµd,  ( ⃗      
  )     . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
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Two-stage choice procedures 394-410, 412-420 
Two-stage choice procedures do not satisfy the same conditions as choice procedures used on the 
second stage. To prove it we can use the same examples but with larger number of alternatives 
eliminated on the first stage of the two-stage choice procedure [11]. 
Thus, it is necessary to check those normative conditions of two-stage choice procedures which were 
satisfied for the second stage choice procedures. 
 Two-stage choice procedure 412 does not satisfy the condition H (see paragraph 412.1 of 
Appendix 1). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 404, 409 do not satisfy the condition C. To prove it the following 
example is used. 
Let               and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d e f 
a - 1 0 0 1 1 
b 0 - 1 1 0 1 
c 1 0 - 1 1 0 
d 1 0 0 - 0 0 
e 0 0 0 1 - 1 
f 0 0 1 1 0 - 
Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗  )         (   ⃗  )     , 
 (   ⃗  )       ,  (   ⃗  )           ,  (   ⃗  )       ,  (   ⃗  )         . Then    ,    , 
   . Thus,  ( ⃗    )         . 
Consider now the subset            . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 a b d e 
a - 1 0 1 
b 0 - 1 0 
d 1 0 - 0 
e 0 0 1 - 
Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗   )       (   ⃗   )     , 
 (   ⃗   )       ,  (   ⃗   )     . Thus,  ( ⃗     
 )           . 
Finally, consider the subset             . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 c d e f 
c - 1 1 0 
d 0 - 0 0 
e 0 1 - 1 
f 1 1 0 - 
Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗    )     ,  (   ⃗    )         , 
 (   ⃗    )     ,  (   ⃗    )     . Then    ,    ,    . Thus,  ( ⃗      
  )         . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 412 do not satisfy the condition C (see paragraph 412.2 of 
Appendix 1). 
 Two-stage choice procedure 404 does not satisfy the condition O. To prove it the following 
example is used. 
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Let               and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d e 
a - 1 0 1 1 
b 0 - 1 1 0 
c 1 0 - 1 0 
d 0 0 0 - 1 
e 0 0 0 0 - 
Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗  )       (   ⃗  )     ,  (   ⃗  )  
   ,  (   ⃗  )         ,  (   ⃗  )       . Then    ,    . Thus,  ( ⃗    )         . 
Consider now the subset          . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 a b c e 
a - 1 0 1 
b 0 - 1 0 
c 1 0 - 0 
e 0 0 0 - 
Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗   )       (   ⃗   )     , 
 (   ⃗   )     ,  (   ⃗   )     . Thus,  ( ⃗     
 )           . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗    ), Consequently, the condition O is not satisfied. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 394-403, 405-407, 409, 412, 414-420 do not satisfy the 
Monotonicity conditionon 1 (the proof follows from the paragraphs 394.5, 409.5 of Appendix 1 
and properties of second stage choice procedures). 
 Two-stage choice procedure 412 does not satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 2 (see 
paragraph 412.1 of Appendix 1). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 393-420 do not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (see the 
properties of Fishburn rule). 
394.5 Monotonicity condition 1. 
Consider the example from paragraph 412.1 of Appendix 1. Suppose that bµc. Then the alternative f is 
eliminated on the first stage and, consequently, the alternative b is not chosen on the second stage. 
Since      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ), the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied. 
409.5 Monotonicity condition 1. 
Let                 and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a b c d e f 
a  - 0 1 0 1 0 
b 0 - 0 1 0 1 
c 0 0 - 0 0 0 
d 0 0 0 - 1 0 
e 0 1 0 0 - 1 
f 1 0 0 0 0 - 
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According to the rule the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )       . 
Suppose that the relative position of the alternative a is improved such that aµb, aµd while the 
relative comparison of any pair of other alternatives remains unchanged. Then a matrix of majority 
relation looks as 
  a b c d e f 
a  - 1 1 1 1 0 
b 0 - 0 1 0 1 
c 0 0 - 0 0 0 
d 0 0 0 - 1 0 
e 0 1 0 0 - 1 
f 1 0 0 0 0 - 
For this case the alternatives a,c,f are considered for the second stage of the choice procedure. Since 
fµa, aµc,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )       . 
Then      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied. 
412.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let                 and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a b c d e f 
a  - 1 1 0 1 0 
b 0 - 0 1 0 1 
c 0 0 - 0 0 1 
d 0 0 0 - 1 0 
e 0 1 0 0 - 0 
f 1 0 0 0 0 - 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )  
     . 
Consider now the subset            . A matrix of majority relation µ looks as 
  a b e f 
a  - 0 1 0 
b 0 - 0 1 
e 0 1 - 0 
f 1 0 0 - 
According to the rule the choice is empty, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )   . 
Then  ( ⃗    )   
         ( ⃗     
 ). Thus, the condition H is not satisfied. 
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412.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let                   and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a b c d e f g 
a  - 0 1 0 1 0 0 
b 0 - 0 1 0 1 1 
c 0 0 - 0 0 1 0 
d 0 0 0 - 1 0 0 
e 0 1 0 0 - 0 1 
f 1 0 0 0 0 - 0 
g 1 0 0 1 0 1 - 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )  
     . 
Consider now the subset          . A matrix of majority relation µ looks as 
  a c d e f g 
a  - 1 0 1 0 0 
c 0 - 0 0 1 0 
d 0 0 - 1 0 0 
e 0 0 0 - 0 1 
f 1 0 0 0 - 0 
g 1 0 1 0 1 - 
According to the given two-stage choice procedure the alternatives c,g will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗     
 )       . 
Finally, consider the subset           . Then a matrix of majority relation µ looks as 
  b c d e f g 
b - 0 1 0 1 1 
c 0 - 0 0 1 0 
d 0 0 - 1 0 0 
e 1 0 0 - 0 1 
f 0 0 0 0 - 0 
g 0 0 1 0 1 - 
According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )     . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
422.5 Monotonicity condition 1. 
Let                 and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a b c d e f 
a  - 1 0 0 0 0 
b 0 - 1 0 0 0 
c 1 0 - 1 1 0 
d 0 0 0 - 0 0 
e 0 0 0 0 - 0 
f 1 0 0 1 0 - 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )         . 
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Suppose that the relative position of the alternative a is improved such that aµc while the relative 
comparison of any pair of other alternatives remains unchanged. Then a matrix of majority relation 
looks as 
 a b c d e f 
a  - 1 0 0 0 0 
b 0 - 1 0 0 0 
c 0 0 - 1 1 0 
d 0 0 0 - 0 0 
e 0 0 0 0 - 0 
f 1 0 0 1 0 - 
For this case the alternatives a,b,c,f are considered for the second stage of the choice procedure. For 
this majority matrix it is possible to construct a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   such that      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  
Then      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied. 
440.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let                 and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a b c d e f 
a  - 0 1 0 0 0 
b 0 - 1 0 0 0 
c 0 0 - 1 1 1 
d 0 0 0 - 1 0 
e 0 0 0 0 - 1 
f 0 0 0 1 0 - 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )  
     . 
Consider now the subset          . A matrix of majority relation µ looks as 
  a b d e f 
a  - 0 0 0 0 
b 0 - 0 0 0 
d 0 0 - 1 0 
e 0 0 0 - 1 
f 0 0 1 0 - 
According to the rule the choice is empty, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )   . 
Then  ( ⃗    )   
         ( ⃗     
 ). Thus, the condition H is not satisfied. 
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465.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Consider the example from paragraph 468.2 of Appendix 1. Then  ( ⃗    )           . 
Consider now the subset          . A matrix of majority relation µ looks as 
  a b c d e f 
a  - 0 0 0 1 1 
b 0 - 0 0 0 0 
c 1 0 - 0 0 1 
d 0 0 1 - 0 1 
e 0 1 1 1 - 0 
f 0 0 0 0 1 - 
According to the given two-stage choice procedure the alternatives a,b,d will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗     
 )         . 
Finally, consider the subset           . Then a matrix of majority relation µ looks as  
  b c d e f g 
b - 0 0 0 0 0 
c 0 - 0 0 1 0 
d 0 1 - 0 1 0 
e 1 1 1 - 0 0 
f 0 0 0 1 - 1 
g 0 0 1 1 0 - 
According to the rule the alternatives b,c,d,g will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )           . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
465.5 Monotonicity condition 1. 
Let             and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a b c d 
a  - 1 0 0 
b 0 - 0 1 
c 1 0 - 0 
d 0 0 1 - 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c,d will be chosen. Suppose that the relative position of the 
alternative a is improved (aµd). Then the alternative d is omitted on the first stage. For this case it is 
possible to construct a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   such that      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  
Then      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied. 
  
47 
 
468.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let                   and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a b c d e f g 
a  - 0 0 0 1 1 0 
b 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 
c 1 0 - 0 0 1 0 
d 0 0 1 - 0 1 0 
e 0 1 1 1 - 0 0 
f 0 0 0 0 1 - 1 
g 0 0 0 0 1 0 - 
According to the given two-stage choice procedure the alternatives a,b,d,g will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗    )           . 
Consider now the subset            . A matrix of majority relation µ looks as 
  a b c f g 
a  - 0 0 1 0 
b 0 - 0 0 0 
c 1 0 - 1 0 
f 0 0 0 - 1 
g 0 0 0 0 - 
According to the rule the alternatives b,c,g will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )         . 
Then  ( ⃗    )   
           ( ⃗     
 ). Thus, the condition H is not satisfied. 
468.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let                   and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a b c d e f g 
a  - 0 0 0 1 1 0 
b 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 
c 1 0 - 0 0 1 0 
d 0 0 1 - 0 1 0 
e 0 1 1 1 - 0 0 
f 0 0 0 0 1 - 1 
g 0 0 0 1 1 0 - 
According to the two-stage choice procedure the alternatives b,g will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )  
     . 
Consider now the subset          . A matrix of majority relation µ looks as 
  a b c e f g 
a  - 0 0 1 1 0 
b 0 - 0 0 0 0 
c 1 0 - 0 1 0 
e 0 1 1 - 0 0 
f 0 0 0 1 - 1 
g 0 0 0 1 0 - 
According to the given two-stage choice procedure the alternatives b,c,g will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗     
 )         . 
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Finally, consider the subset                 . Then a matrix of majority relation µ looks as 
  c d g 
c - 0 0 
d 1 - 0 
g 0 1 - 
According to the rule the alternatives c,g will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )       . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ( ⃗    ). Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
468.5 Monotonicity condition 1. 
Let                   and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
  a c d e f g 
a  - 0 0 0 1 0 
c 1 - 0 0 1 0 
d 0 1 - 0 1 0 
e 0 1 1 - 0 0 
f 0 0 0 1 - 1 
g 0 0 1 1 0 - 
According to the rule the alternatives e,f are omitted on the first stage. Suppose that the relative 
position of the alternative a is improved such that aµg while the relative comparison of any pair of 
other alternatives remains unchanged. Then the alternatives e,f are omitted on the first stage. For this 
case it is possible to construct a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   such that      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  
Then      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied. 
Two-stage choice procedures 478-494, 496-504 
Two-stage choice procedures 478-494, 496-504 satisfy the same conditions as two-stage choice 
procedures which use the Fishburn rule and Uncovered set I on the first stage. To prove it we can use 
the same examples that are used for these rules [11]. 
 
Two-stage choice procedures 534-538,543,554,558 
Two-stage choice procedures do not satisfy the same conditions as choice procedures used on the 
second stage. As for other normative conditions, two-stage choice procedures 534-538,543,554,558 do 
not satisfy any of them as the subset of alternatives for the second stage can be easily changed when 
the core is applied on the first stage of the rule. To prove it we can provide the following example. 
534.5 Monotonicity condition 1. 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a a c b b d d 
c c c a d d b b 
b d d b c a c c 
d b b d a c a a 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
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Suppose now that the position of the alternative a was improved in   
  while the relative comparison of 
any pair of other alternatives remained unchanged. 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
a a a c b b d d 
c c c a d a b b 
b d d b c d c c 
d b b d a c a a 
Then the alternative d will be omitted after applying the first choice procedure (core) and the subset 
          will be presented for the second choice procedure (the plurality rule). A contraction of a 
profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  onto a set   , i.e.,   ⃗⃗ ⃗   , looks as 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
a a a c b b b b 
c c c a c a c c 
b b b b a c a a 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )   (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗   )     . 
Then      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied for the 
given two-stage choice procedure. 
 
Two-stage choice procedures 561-588 
Two-stage choice procedures 561-588 do not satisfy the same normative conditions as two-stage 
choice procedures which use minimal weakly stable set on the first stage. To prove it similar examples 
can be used but with larger number of alternatives (see the properties of k-stable set) [11].  
Two-stage choice procedures 589-616 
To check the properties of two-stage choice procedures 589-616 it is possible to use the same counter-
examples that were used to check the properties of the threshold rule [11]. Thus, it remained to check 
normative conditions which are satisfied for the threshold rule. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 589-616 satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1. The proof 
follows from properties of the threshold rule (an improved position of any chosen alternative x 
leads to the choice of only this alternative on the first stage of two-stage procedure). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 589-616 do not satisfy the non-compensatory condition. To proof 
it the following example is provided. 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a b c 
d a b 
b c a 
c d d 
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According to the first stage rule, the alternatives a and b will be chosen on the first stage of the two-
stage choice procedure. Consider now the subset            . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a 
set   , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 
a b b 
b a a 
According to the second stage rule, the alternative b will be chosen on the second stage of the two-
stage choice procedure. Thus,  ( ⃗    )        
Now let us write the profile  ⃗   in the following form 
X          
a 4 3 2 
b 2 4 3 
c 1 2 4 
d 3 1 1 
According to the non-compensatory condition the alternatives a,b (the alternatives a and b are equal) 
are better than the alternative c and the alternative c is better than the alternative d. Thus, the non-
compensatory condition is not satisfied as        ( ⃗    ). 
Two-stage choice procedures 617-700 
Two-stage choice procedures do not satisfy the same conditions as Copeland rules 1-3 and choice 
procedures used on the second stage. To prove it similar examples can be used but with larger number 
of alternatives [11]. Thus, it remained to check normative conditions which are satisfied for Copeland 
rules 1-3 and choice procedures used on the second stage. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 617-620, 623-624, 628-648, 651-652, 656-676, 679-680, 684-700 
satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1 (the proof follows from properties of Copeland rules 1-
3 and choice procedures used on the second stage). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 621-622, 625-627, 649-650, 653-655, 677-678, 681-683 do not 
satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1 (the same example that was used to check the properties 
of the second stage choice procedures can be provided). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 617-700 do not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (the 
proof follows from properties of Copeland rules 1-3). 
 
Two-stage choice procedures 701-728 
Two-stage choice procedures do not satisfy the same conditions as choice procedures used on the 
second stage. To prove it similar examples can be used but with larger number of alternatives [11]. 
Thus, it remained to check normative conditions which areaz satisfied for choice procedures used on 
the second stage. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 701, 719-720 do not satisfy the condition H (the proof follows 
from properties of super-threshold rule). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 712, 717, 719-720 do not satisfy the condition C (the proof 
follows from properties of super-threshold rule). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 712, 717 do not satisfy the condition O (the proof follows from 
properties of super-threshold rule). 
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 Two-stage choice procedures 701, 712-713, 719-720 satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1 
(the proof follows from properties of threshold-rule and choice procedures used on the second 
stage). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 702-711, 714-718, 721-728 do not satisfy the Monotonicity 
conditionon 1. Since super-threshold rule narrows the subset of alternatives remained after the 
first stage of the procedure, alternatives dominated by the chosen one might be eliminated on 
the first stage and, consequently, on the second stage of the rule the chosen alternative will not 
be included into a new choice.  
 Two-stage choice procedures 701-728 do not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (the 
proof follows from properties of super-threshold rule). 
 
Two-stage choice procedures 729-784 
To check the properties of two-stage choice procedures which use minimax and Simpson procedures 
on the first stage we can use the same counter-examples which were used to check the properties of 
minimax and Simpson procedures [11]. Thus, it remained to study those normative conditions which 
are satisfied for choice procedures used on the first stage. 
 Two-stage choice procedures 729, 740-741, 747-748, 757, 768-769, 775-776 satisfy the 
Monotonicity conditionon 1 (the proof follows from properties of Minimax and Simpson 
procedures and choice procedures used on the second stage). 
 Two-stage choice procedures 730-739, 742-746, 749-756, 758-767, 770-774, 777-784  do not 
satisfy the Monotonicity conditionon 1. To prove it the following example for the two-stage 
choice procedure 731 is given.  
Let           and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
c c b a a a a a c d d d d b c 
b b c b c c c c b c b b b a d 
d d d c b b b b d a a a a d a 
a a a d d d d d a b c c c c b 
Let us construct a matrix   ( ⃗    ) for the profile  ⃗  . 
 a b c d 
a - 7 9 6 
b 8 - 6 10 
c 6 9 - 10 
d 9 5 5 - 
According to the minimax procedure used on the first stage, the alternatives a,b,c will be chosen, i.e., 
  ( ⃗    )         , where    is a Minimax choice procedure. 
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of a profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
c c b a a a a a c c b b b b c 
b b c b c c c c b a a a a a a 
a a a c b b b b a b c c c c b 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
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Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a in    
 . 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
  
c c b a a a a a c d d d d b c 
b b c b c c c c b a b b b a d 
d d d c b b b b d c a a a d a 
a a a d d d d d a b c c c c b 
Let us construct a matrix   (  ⃗⃗  ⃗   ) for the profile   ⃗⃗  ⃗ . 
 a b c d 
a - 7 10 6 
b 8 - 6 10 
c 5 9 - 10 
d 9 5 5 - 
According to the minimax procedure used on the first stage, the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e., 
  (  ⃗⃗  ⃗   )       , where    is a Minimax choice procedure. 
Consider now the subset             . A contraction of a profile   ⃗⃗  ⃗  onto a set  
  , i.e.,   ⃗⃗  ⃗   , 
looks as 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
  
b b b a a a a a b a b b b b a 
a a a b b b b b a b a a a a b 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  (  ⃗⃗  ⃗   )     . 
Then      ( ⃗    ),      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity conditionon 1 is not satisfied. 
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Исследуются двухступенчатые процедуры выбора, которые представляют собой суперпозицию 
двух процедур выбора. Показано, какие из рассматриваемых процедур выбора удовлетворяют 
существующим нормативным условиям, описывающим, каким образом изменяется конечный 
выбор при изменении предъявляемого множества альтернатив и оценок альтернатив по критериям. 
Особое внимание уделяется двухступенчатым процедурам, в основе которых лежат позиционные 
правила, а также правила, использующие мажоритарное отношение, вспомогательную числовую 
шкалу и турнирную матрицу. Приводится теорема о том, какие нормативные условия выполняются 
для рассматриваемых двухступенчатых процедур выбора. Оценена вычислительная сложность 
двухступенчатых процедур выбора и время их выполнения на реальных данных.
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